- GPS Tracking for Children: Is It a Violation of Children’s Privacy?
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Nowadays, we can use a GPS (global positioning system) to track our children’s steps. A child locator or kids GPS is an advanced technology system that helps parents know where their children are. The system provides immediate wander alerts and directional guidance so parents know the specific location where their children are and are aware if children get away from school or “authorized zones.” Kids GPS vary on capability, area of coverage, functions, and prices. Some of them allow audio. This means, you can hear children’s conversations anywhere they are. GPS tracking for children may also be ordered by courts in juvenile cases as condition for probation. Is GPS tracking for children a violation of children’s right to privacy or denial of equal protection of the law?
GPS tracking systems may be installed in children’s clothing, backpacks, watches, etc. Also, they are commonly used by parents to track teenagers. They can be placed in the teenager’s car and any other accessory that provides no warning to the juvenile. It is a fact that in the United States and, probably in many other countries, missing children is an ever increasing problem. The use of kids GPS may be an excellent source to save children’s lives. Some may call the use of kids GPS safety and others may call it paranoia. Yet, this is not the relevant issue. The relevant issue is whether GPS tracking for children violates children’s privacy when used by parents. For the time being, there is no legal precedent decision to answer this specific question in the United States (U.S.). The Constitution and Privacy laws of the United States protect individuals’ freedoms and privacy. They usually do not differentiate on whether the individual is a minor or an adult. In fact, the Constitution of the United States guarantees equal protection of the law. Thus, by now we can just voice our opinions and wait for the first legal decision that addresses this specific issue.
Regarding GPS children tracking by court order, some U.S. courts have addressed the issue of GPS tracking systems used in juvenile offenders who are placed in probation. In the California case of Re R.V., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (2009), the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, answered the question of whether a GPS tracking system placed in juvenile offenders as condition for probation was a violation of the minor’s right to privacy and denial of equal protection of the law.
The juvenile in this case was a 16 years old and accused of receiving stolen property for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The facts show the minor used illegal substances, was involved in gang activities, and had no parental control. After conviction, the minor was ordered home detention, which he violated several times. Then, the minor was ordered to use a GPS tracking device to assure that he was attending school and that he was within the court-authorized zones. The minor challenged the imposition of the GPS device. He argued it violated his privacy rights and his right to Equal Protection of the law.
The court held that the GPS tracking system imposed for this minor did not violate his right to privacy or deny him equal protection of the law. The court held that this system was statutorily authorized for adult probationers and was also permissible for juvenile probation. Also, the court held, this tracking system was reasonable related to the minor’s past behavior and was likely to deter future criminality. The juvenile was being monitored to assure that he was at school and observing his curfew.
Therefore, GPS tracking for children when ordered by courts for probation purposes may not violate children’s right to privacy or deny them equal protection of the law. Hence, whether the same tracking system used by parents violates privacy rights is another issue not yet addressed by the U.S. courts.
- Court-Ordered Parenting Programs: State Courses v. Out-of-State Online Courses
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United States (U.S.) family courts are increasingly ordering parents facing divorce with minor children to attend parenting programs. These programs are designed to help parents and children solve those major issues that divorce brings, such as adjustment of children to parental separation, dispute resolution and conflict management, visitation guidelines, united parenting, and stress reduction in children. This is definitely a wise recourse to keep both parents involved in the children’s future and to lessen the emotional impact of divorce. Connecticut is one of the states whose statutes order parenting education programs. This article illustrates on the approach Connecticut’s courts took regarding parenting education programs offered by out-of-state vendors and taken online.
Connecticut’s General Statutes Sec. 46b-69b and Practice Book Sec. 25-5(a)(6) require parenting education programs whenever a minor child is involved in divorce proceedings. These programs last six hours, and may be taken in two courses of three-hour class or three courses of two-hour class. Connecticut defines parenting education programs as "[A] course designed by the Judicial Department to educate persons, including unmarried parents, on the impact on children of the restructuring of families. The course shall include, but not be limited to, information on the development stages of children, adjustment of children to parental separation, dispute resolution and conflict management, guidelines for visitation, stress reduction in children and cooperative parenting. Parents may take “comparable” parenting education programs. This means, they may choose different course vendors as long as the courses are comparable.
In the case of Recile v. Recile, FA-054-008-087S (2006), the Superior Court of Connecticut, District of Waterbury, first answered the question of whether an online parenting education course offered by a Florida vendor was a comparable course and allowed under the Connecticut statute for purposes of compliance with the court-ordered parenting education program. In this case, plaintiff requested the court to permit him to enroll in a Florida parenting education program called Positive Parenting Through Divorce (PPTD), which was offered online. Plaintiff did not submit evidence that this course was comparable with Connecticut’s programs. Connecticut’s Superior Court had held in the case of Victor v. Victor, Docket No. FA 99 0174903 (2001), that a New York parenting education program was comparable or substantially similar to those offered in Connecticut and, therefore, the requesting parent could complete that course. Thus, according to this precedent, it is required that out-of-states programs be substantially similar to those offered in Connecticut. In Recile v. Recile, the court held that the Florida online program was not substantially similar or comparable with parenting education programs offered in Connecticut.
Also, the court addressed the issue of whether these courses must be taken in-person or whether online courses comply with the purpose of the statute. To answer this question, the court first reviewed surveys showing the positive impact parenting education programs have shown in Connecticut. Then, the court reviewed the language of the statute and the legislative intent. The court held that the language of the statute does not expressly allow parties to participate in online parenting education courses. Regarding the legislative intent, the court held that the legislature intended the parenting education programs to be in-person. The legislature even provided examples of in-person courses deemed to be effective in helping couples facing divorce.
The court said that online parenting education courses do not provide the interactive and complete information that in-person courses do. For instance, in-person courses have a mixture of videos, chats, and role playing scenarios that may relate to parents’ own situation. Yet, the online courses may be less interactive and only help parents to go through the course material as quickly as possible to obtain the required certification. Also, the court noted, online courses do not provide the assurance that the one taking the course is really the parent to whom the court order is issued. Lastly, the court said that parenting education courses are ordered for the benefit of children and, in the case of online courses, parental convenience should not be given foremost consideration.
Therefore, in Recile v. Recile, Connecticut’s Superior Court rejected the approval of online parenting education courses.
- Individuals Standing in Actions for Annulment
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The European Union (EU) Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament is the community law concerning the processing of data and protection of privacy in electronic communications. As any other EU Directive, Member states must incorporate Directives' precepts within their domestic legislation. An interesting issue arouse when an individual filed a petition for partial annulment of Directive 2002/58/EC before the Fourth Chamber (Court of First Instance of the European Communities) and, on appeal, the European Court of Justice rendered its final decision holding that this individual did not have standing to seek annulment of the EU Directive. EU Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament is commonly known as the "Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications." This Directive establishes rules protecting the right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data in the electronic communication sector, and provides rules for the free movement of such data in the EU community. Directive 2002/58/EC complements Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament regarding individuals' protection rights when third parties process or transfer their personal data across EU borders. Articles 13(1) to (3) of Directive 2002/58/EC were contested by an individual plaintiff before the Court of First Instance. Article 13 is titled" "Unsolicited Communications" and establishes that prior consent must be obtained from recipients of direct marketing communications when those communications are sent through fax, automated calling systems, or e-mail. The same Article establishes that a business or natural person may obtain their clients' e-mail address and send direct marketing e-mails of their similar products or services, provided that those clients are given the opportunity to object, easy and free of charge, to such contact. Lastly, Article 13 requires EU Member States to adopt legislation that ensures that unsolicited direct marketing communications, except the two previous cases explained above, are forbidden unless prior consent from the recipients is obtained or the wishes of those rejecting these types of communications are considered. Additionally, Preamble 40 to Directive 2002/58/EC established: "Safeguards should be provided for subscribers against intrusion of their privacy by unsolicited communications for direct marketing purposes, in particular by means of automated calling machines, telefaxes, and e-mails, including SMS messages. These forms of unsolicited commercial communications may on the one hand be relatively easy and cheap to send and on the other may impose a burden and/or cost on the recipient. Moreover, in some cases their volume may also cause difficulties for electronic communications networks and terminal equipment. For such forms of unsolicited communications for direct marketing, it is justified to require that prior explicit consent of the recipients is obtained before such communications are addressed to them. The single market requires a harmonized approach to ensure simple, Community-wide rules for businesses and users." The plaintiff seeking partial annulment of Directive 2002/58/EC is a French internet user and owner of the domain name 'Internet-libre.net.' Plaintiff sent a bulk of unsolicited employment applications via e-mail. He also used this method to make himself known. Plaintiff's e-mails say they are sent by 'Internet-libre.net' and allow recipients to opt-out from the mailing list. Plaintiff filed the present petition for partial annulment of Directive 2002/58/EC before the Court of First Instance, particularly regarding Articles 13(1) to (3). The EU Parliament and the Council raised an objection to plaintiff's petition arguing inadmissibility pursuant to Article 114 of the Rules of Procedures of the Court of First Instance. They also argued that Article 13(1) of the challenged Directive was not directly applicable to plaintiff because he was not an intended direct subject of these regulations. The European Court of Justice held that even though Article 230 EC does not expressly address the issue of whether private persons may file actions for annulment of a directive, case law shows that this fact alone does not render these actions automatically inadmissible. What Article 230 EC does says is that: "any natural or legal person may ... institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former." Thus, the Court reasoned, in these situations it is required to analyze whether the challenged directive is a decision of 'direct and individual concern' to the applicant for annulment within the meaning of Article 230 EC. The Court held that Directive 2002/58 is a legislative measure regulating objective and specific situations regarding electronic communications. This Directive was applicable to any natural or legal person that provides electronic communications services and to any subscriber of those services. The fact that the Directive is a legislative measure does not itself precludes private parties' actions for annulment. The main issue is whether the directive is of individual or direct concern to the applicant for annulment. In the present case, the Court held, Directive 2002/58/EC was not specifically directed to plaintiff. The Directive was directed to any Internet user, business or natural person. There are not distinctions in the Directive that makes it of individual concern for the plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff's action for annulment was inadmissible and the case was dismissed. Paul Vannieuwenhuyze-Morin v. Council of the European Union and European Parliament European, Court reports 2003 Page II-01997 (2003).
- Is there any web hosting regulation for foreign online retailers who want to ship products to US?
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I'm a researcher consulting for a foreign e-commerce business. They want to start selling/ship their products to the USA through their website.
Apperantly, it is requiered that they have its website on a server in US in order to sell/ship products to US consumers.
I need your help to understand if this is really mandatory. It seems very strange to me that one MUST have servers in the US.
Thanks,
Gaby
- The U.K. Gambling Act 2005, Part I
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The United Kingdom (U.K.) Parliament enacted the Gambling Act 2005 to regulate three major gambling categories: gaming, betting, and lottery. This Act, among others, establishes the Gambling Commission; sets license requirements, including operating, personal, and premises licenses; identifies gambling offenses; sets rules for the protection of children and young persons; regulates gambling advertising; and addresses the legality and enforceability of gambling contracts. This article informs about the foundation of this Act, licensing authorities and the Gambling Commission, the definition of gambling and remote gambling, what constitutes gaming, betting, and lottery under the Gambling Act.
U.K. Gambling Act 2005 (The Gambling Act) is based on the premise that the government must license gambling activities. The licensing objectives include (1) preventing gambling from being a source of disorder that could enable or support crime; (2) ensuring that gambling is conducted in a fair and open manner; and (3) protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling. Part 1, 1.
The Gambling Act establishes the licensing authorities and the Gambling Commission. The licensing authorities for England are (1) a district council, (2) a county council when there is no district council, (3) a London borough council, (4) a Common Council of the City of London, and (5) and the Council of the Isles of Scilly. The licensing authorities for Wales are (1) a country council, and (2) a county borough council. Part 1, 2. The Gambling Act establishes a Gambling Commission whose duties are to promote the licensing objectives and permit gambling within the parameter of the licensing objectives. Part 2, 22. Other duties of the Gambling Commission include setting out the principles to be applied by it in the exercise of its functions, issuing one or more code of practice for gambling facilities, issuing guidance for local authorities involved with gambling licenses, giving and advising the Secretary of State about gambling activities, setting compliance rules, and investigating and prosecuting gambling offenses. Part 2, 22-28.
Gambling, under the Gambling Act, includes three categories: gaming, betting, and lottery. Part 1, 3. The Gambling Act also addresses the issue of “remote gambling.” Remote gambling is defined as any gambling in which persons participate by the use of remote communication. This includes the Internet, television, telephone, radio, or any other kind of electronic or technology for facilitating communication.
Under the Gambling Act, gaming means playing a game of chance for a prize. Gaming includes games of chance, casinos, and equal chance gaming. A game of chance does not include a sport; it may include (1) a game that involves an element of chance and an element of skill, (2) a game that involves an element of chance that can be eliminated by superlative skill, and (3) a game presented as involving an element of chance. Prizes may include money or money’s worth. Casinos are defined as arrangements whereby people are given the opportunity to participate in casino games. Casino games are games of chance not including equal chance games. Casinos may be classified in four categories: Regional, Large, Small, and below the minimal size. Lastly, gaming is equal chance gaming if “it does not involve playing or staking against a bank,” and “the chances are equally favorable to all participants.”
In the Gambling Act, betting means making or accepting a bet on (1) the outcome of a race, event or process; (2) the likelihood of anything occurring or not occurring; (3) whether anything is or is not true.
The Gambling Act defines both simple and complex lottery. An arrangement is a simple lottery if the following three elements are found: (1) people is required to pay to participate, (2) one or more prizes are allocated to one or more members of a class, and (3) prizes are allocated by a process that relies wholly on chance. An arrangement is a complex lottery if the three above-mentioned elements are found and if the prizes are allocated by a series of processes. In the case of lotteries, prizes may include money, services, or articles.
- Internet-Computer Legal Protection?
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What are some areas that might need protection, but are not protected by current
laws pertaining to computers? Do we need new legislation to deal with these
problems ?
First Name: Barbara
Last Name: glodfelter
Phone:
Email:
sassybarbe@hotmail.com
Phone: 775-537-0227
Address: 4031 moapa st
City:
pahrump
Country: United
States
==========================================
Legal Issue:
- Bosnia & Herzegovina Protection of Personal Data
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Concerns about cybercrime and identity theft lead to the enactment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on the Protection of Personal Data 2006, which intends to protect citizens’ right to privacy. The law provides for the establishment of an Agency for Protection of Personal Data, which is still in the process of being formed. In the interim, the Ministry of Justice regulates data access control and transfer. This article provides a synopsis of this privacy law.
The June 2006 Law on the Protection of Personal Data (LPPD) codifies the right to privacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and was enacted as a response to the problem of cybercrime and identity theft. It establishes an Agency for Protection of Personal Data (‘the Agency’) (Chapter IV, Articles 34 to 47). In the interim, departments of the Ministry of Justice will carry out what will be the Agency’s functions. The Agency will be responsible for ensuring the protection of personal data, which includes supervising the implementation of the Data Protection Law and other personal data processing laws; submitting reports to Parliament; proposing legislation; and giving effect to international agreements. The Ministry of Justice has issued guidance for data access requests, pending the creation of the Agency.
The LPPD regulates the processing and transfer of data. (Article 12). Cross-border data transfer is brought into line with international standards under the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 1981, and protocol regarding supervisory authorities and cross-border data flows. (Article 18). The LPPD applies to all public authorities. (Article 2). A responsible person within the public authority may be fined up to KM $5,000 (Article 52) for a breach. Personal data may only be processed to the extent necessary for a permitted purpose, and only with consent. (Article 4).The data controller and data processor are required to register with the Agency prior to establishing a database. (Article 14); the maximum penalty for failing to do so is a fine of KM$150,000. (Article 50).
On October 31, 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Memorandum on Legal and Judicial Guarantees against Unlawful Processing of Personal Data. The SEECP includes a declaration of commitment to enforce basic principles for data protection and to establish an independent supervising authority.
The Agency will also have powers under the Freedom of Information Act 2001 (FOIA), last amended in 2008, which provides for a broad right of access to data held by any public authority. The FOIA requires personal information under control of a public organ to be correct, current and complete. Data subjects can request access to information and amendment of the information. Those who have been denied information by a public body can appeal internally, lodge a complaint with the Ministry of Justice (or, in the future, with the Agency), and challenge the decision in court or lodge a complaint with the Federation Ombudsman. There is no right of appeal against the Agency’s decision as such, but judicial review applications can be made under the Law on Administrative Procedure. (Article 40).
What rights do individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina have to access personal data?
Data subjects are entitled to receive updates on the progress of data processing and to know the legal basis for its collection and its source. (Article 24). Individuals are entitled to access their personal data upon request. Under article 28, exceptions include national security, professional regulations, and economic grounds. Data access requests may not disproportionately compromise the rights of other individuals. The data controller may refuse a request if he is required to process the data by law, if it has already been published publicly, or if he is processing it exclusively for scientific research or archiving.
How are the data subject’s rights enforced?
When a data subject suspects a breach of his rights has occurred or will occur, he may file a complaint with the Agency, which can require the data to be amended or deleted. (Article 30(1)). A court can award damages (Article 32), even from data controllers, for damage caused by a data processor; also, the court can order a public apology. (Article 33).
The Agency will have extensive investigative, (Article 41(2)), and enforcement powers, (Article 40), including destruction of data; a ban on processing; and issuing a warning or reprimand. The controller must implement measures ordered by the Agency within 15 days (Article 41(1)). Failure to comply constitutes an offense (Article 49).
What penalties can be imposed on data controllers or processors who violated the law?
Chapter 5 of the LPPD creates a graded series of penalties for offenses, including a fine up to $100,000, e.g., failing to check accuracy (Article 49). The responsible person may also be fined up to KM $15,000 for a violation or KM $10,000 if he is an employee. Certain offenses, such as establishing a data filing system before submitting a request with the Agency (Article 14, Paragraph 2), may result in a fine of up to KM $150,000. (Article 50).
Conclusion:
The Law on the Protection of Personal Data 2006 regulates the right to privacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The law provides for the establishment of an Agency for Protection of Personal Data.
- Tradetang Ripoff?
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What rights do American consumers have when merchandise they purchased on
Tradetang, that clearly illustrates American made products, is ripped off when
what they actually receive are counterfeit knock-offs? I purchased 2 guitars on
Tradetang from a merchant whose user name is wanglaoj117 and whose ad pictured a
vintage Mosrite and Rickenbacker 370-12 guitars but what I received without
warning after I placed an order for one of each were blatent substitutions that
violate U.S. copyright infringement laws. The seller only will offer a partial
refund and expects me to pay return shipping - on counterfeit merchandise? No
Way!
First Name: Charles
Last Name: Carter
Phone:
Email:
cdcarter@rochester.rr.com
Phone: 7165422411
Address: 6 Marshall
Avenue
City: Akron, NY
- Hong Kong’s Criminal Copyright Infringement: What Constitutes a Copy Capable of Distribution?
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Hong Kong not only straightened its copyright laws, but its authorities are actively prosecuting copyright violations; a smart move in an increasingly globalized economy. Hence, not always, statutory rules are clear and it is in these cases when courts render legal interpretations. As in any country, statutory interpretations rendered by appellate courts become legal precedents in Hong Kong. This article informs about the Hong Kong’s appellate court’s interpretation of a “copy capable of distribution,” as a required element of the criminal offense of copyright infringement; particularly, when applied to Internet distribution of digital copies.
Hong Kong’s Copyright Ordinance (Cap 528), 118(1)(f), states that a person commits a criminal offense when, without the license of the copyright owner, he distributes an infringing copy of the copyright work, in the course of, for the purpose of, or in connection with any trade or business, to such an extent as to prejudicially affect the owner of the copyright work. Thus, according to this rule, (1) there must be a copyright work, (2) a copy must be distributed in the course of, or in connection with any trade or business, and (3) such distribution must prejudice the copyright owner’s rights. Obviously, element two seems to be the central and most-difficult-to-prove element; that is, when a copy is capable of distribution according to the statute.
In the case of Chan Nai Ming v. Hksar, 2007 HKCU 849, (hereafter Chan case), Respondent was charged with attempting criminal copyright infringement for unlicensed dissemination of copyright films via Internet; particularly through the use of “BitTorrent” technology. An interesting fact in this case is that to avoid proving element three -prejudice to the copyright owner- the prosecution charged Respondent with “attempting copyright infringement,” rather than the full offense of copyright infringement. This was a strategy used in this case in which distribution occurred via the Internet and proving element three becomes a challenge.
The BitTorrent system is a variant of a “peer-to-peer” file sharing system. This system does not require a centralized server holding the film’s pictures reduced to digital forms; such server would slow the download process and be impractical for Internet distribution. BitTorrent system retransmits the film’s pictures to other peer computers; there is a “seeder” computer that holds the initial files to be downloaded, and a computer that acts as “tracker server” to allow the flow of data from the seeder to the users’ computers. Users need to install the BitTorrent software in their computers to be able to access films transmitted through this technology. The seeder computer is where the infringer has to download “a copy” of the file to be disseminated, in this case, the film. In the Chan case, it was proven that Respondent downloaded a copy of the copyright film in his computer’s hard drive and made arrangements to allow transmission of this file. Respondent, and anyone disseminating files through BitTorrent system, makes the copyright work available to others through advertisement (Ads). These Ads publicize the file as a .torrent file in Internet newsgroups. The court record shows that Respondent in this case did such Ads and made the copyright film available to others. Authorities had to determine whether Respondent provided a connection with the tracker server and redirected users to the seeder computer to enable copies to be downloaded. This proof was in fact provided during trial. The question was whether Respondent’s seeder computer containing the copyright film amounted to distribution of a copyright and whether the film in Respondent’s seeder computer constituted a copy under copyright law.
The court held, contrary to Respondent’s claim, that a “copy” for purposes of criminal copyright infringement under the Hong Kong’s copyright law, may be a digital copy in the context of data transmitted through the Internet. The court held that after reviewing the definition of copy, Respondent “reproduced the work in a material form;” this is, he copied the film in his hard drive and created a digital copy. Regarding to the distribution issue, Respondent argued that he did not “distributed” copies of the work. Instead, his action was passive after he downloaded the initial film in his hard drive. The court held that Respondent conduct was not passive. Indeed, Respondent took many other steps to make the film available to others. For instance, he kept his computer connected to the network that allowed users to communicate with the tracking computer and the seeder. The fact that this process was performed by software, rather than by his active intervention was not a convincing argument for the court.
Thus, a digital copy constitutes a copy under Hong Kong’s copyright law; and distribution of copyright works through software of other technological means may constitute distribution under the same law.
- Education Program Requirements?
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Dear Sir / Madam I have three programs for education and training development,
and I would like to register them as a (Brand Names) in one state only with the
minimum limit. Could you please tell me about the cost and the time needed for
registration and sending me the certificate of registration by post. 1. (SLED)
Smart Leader for Education Development. 2. (SLTD) Smart Leader for Training
Development. 3. (SLPDI) Smart Leader for Professional Development Indicator.
Thank you very much Company: LCC
First Name: ABDULLAH
Last Name: ALMEFLH
Phone:
Email:
mflh66@yahoo.com
Phone: +966500688896
Address: 29270 Riyadh 11457
City:
Riyadh
- Be Careful- There May not be Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Text Messages
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Is there reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages? Just as this question arouse in the context of e-mails, telephonic conversations, computer information, and other technological means, users are now wondering whether their text messages are truly private. A simple answer is no; there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages when those messages are offered by one of the parties to the communication. This article provides a legal explanation to this issue through a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people’s expectation of privacy provided that two elements are met: (1) that there is a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that society is prepared to recognized that expectation as objectively reasonable. United States (U.S.) courts, however, have unanimously recognized that no expectation of privacy exists when information is revealed to a third party and that party voluntarily conveys the information to government authorities, even if the party revealing the information thinks the information is revealed in confidence or for a limited purpose. These two well settled constitutional principles have been applied to the text messaging context.
In the case of United States v. Jones, 149 Fed. Appx. 954 (Ct. of Appeals 11th Cir. 2005) (hereafter Jones), several defendants were indicted on numerous charges of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana. Defendants performed these activities in Nevada, Florida, Tennessee and California, and communicated among them through text messages. The illicit drugs were shipped through the use of common parcel carriers. The government intended to use the text messages sent among defendants to prosecute them. They were obtained by subpoena from the company providing text messages. Defendants moved to suppress that evidence on constitutional grounds; that is, they claimed reasonable expectation of privacy. The district court ruled for defendants and ordered suppression of evidence found in the text messages. Then, the government used one of the defendants as key witness. This witness offered those text messages in which he communicated with his co- defendants. These messages were offered as evidence in court and the district court held that those messages were allowed as evidence as long as they related to communication the key witness sent to or received from the co-defendants. Defendants against whom the text messages were introduced were convicted, and they appealed that conviction.
The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the text messages offered by the key witness because they were messages in which he participated. The court admitted that expectation of privacy in text messages or e-mails was a new issue for this court, and it compared how other circuits had solved this legal issue. Other circuits have compared e-mails with letters sent by postal mail, the court held. Although mail letters are protected by the Fourth Amendment, "if a letter is sent to another, the sender's expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery." United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1995). Also, the court held, an individual sending an e-mail loses "a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail that had already reached its recipient." Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Therefore, analogizing these holdings to text messages, the transmitter of a message enjoys reasonable expectation of privacy that government authorities will not intercept their communication without probable cause and a search warrant, but once a transmission is sent and received by another person, the transmitter no longer controls its destiny. Therefore, defendants in this case had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages received or sent to their co-defendant and key witness. Thus, this evidence was properly admitted.
This holding and the U.S. trend on text messages and privacy is clear: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages sent to or received when they are revealed by one of the participants to the communication, even if they were sent in confidence and with a limited purpose.
- New Online Business Requirements
-
==========================================
Legal
Issue:
I currently do not possess a company which does business on the
net. Neither do i have a company that runs conventionally. However, I am
planning to establish a company online that sell soft copy products such as
software and programs. these software and programs will not be made by my
business party, but i am planning to buy software and programs from many
companies and sell them online in one website. I would like to know whether: 1.
it is legal to run such a kind of business 2. do i have to obtain license and
how 3. how will i be taxed by the government 4. citizenship/immigration status
matter in this case Thank
you
==========================================
IFirst Name: afiqah
Last Name: ayauf
Phone:
Email:
afiqahayauf89@gmail.com
Phone: 316 519 0670
Address: 4000 E 17st N
City: Wichita
- Desist Order for Online Gambling?
-
Our company www.twonix.com has developed software that is available as a free
download to users. The software enables users to view and access their personal
betting accounts and place bets using their accounts. The software also
downloads and displays locally, all the odds available from the different
betting agencies that a user can bet into if they have an account. 1. We do not
republish any information in the public domain. 2. Users of our software can
view information locally that is readily available on the web to anyone. 3. User
of our software cannot file share or transmit any information using our product.
4. We do not charge for our product We have been served with a "desist" notice
by the lawyers of one of the bookmakers...I don't believe we are in breach but if
their is any material/advice that could help us to determine if we are it would
be very helpful.
First Name: Stephen
Last Name: Baghdadi
Phone:
Email: sb@twonix.com
Phone: 0408909090
Address: 307 Pitt Street
City: Sydney
Country: Australia
- Server Location Requirements
-
Hello, I want to set up a collaborative platform (web application) for my
company to share datas among people working in Europe and United States. Is
anything in the US law telling what the server location should be ? Is it
related with the kind of datas and their confidentiality (aircraft) ? Could the
server be located in Europe if my company is registered under the US law ?
Thanks for your help. Best regards.Company:
First Name: matthieu
Last Name: lemaire
Phone:
Email:
lemaire.matthieu@gmail.com
Phone: +33684654229
Address: 18 rue
heinrich
City: boulogne-billancourt
Country: France
- Green Card/Visa Questions
-
Hi.I am an American citizen.My son is in America.He is a student.He is 23 years
old.He came to America on Sept.08 ,2001.Visa type B-2 , which expired on mar
07,2002.Then I got green card I applied for his green card/sent to INS petition
for relative,form I-130/.They sent me notice his case filed under
section:Unmarried child 21/older of permanent resident, 203(a)(2)(B)INA .Now I
am citizen of America.Do I have update his case or...What is my next step? Is it possible for him to get a green card an d how long will it take? Thanks
First Name: bayar
Last Name: GL
Phone:
Email:
bbayarg@yahoo.com
Phone: 7033563106
Address: 7403 lisle ave
City: falls
church
Country: United States
.