IBLS Speaker's Corner

ON-LINE MORTGAGE FRAUD IN FLORIDA ?

Jerry — Fri, 06 Nov 2009 18:16:00 GMT

Website: http://www.sarasota.realforeclose.com We are wanting to nullify a sale which occurred over the above website. I am having a very difficult time finding out the ramifications of a literally "BROKEN" EULA contract. I have created a timestamped copy of how the website looked when we made our purchase: www.pangaea.to/srqrealforeclose.pdf please see page 6 of this agreement, you will see it is but off. the portion which is but off includes everything about the disclaimer, etc. and our I agree to the terms... you can see the REAL EULA on their sister website, manatee.realforeclose.com Can we legally nullify our contract with them? At present time, five counties of Florida offer, in conjunction with realforeclose.com, foreclosure sales online. These are not only mortgage foreclosures, but also a good number of condominium lien foreclosures. My husband and I have calculated that approximately 90% of all association lien foreclosure sales we've seen online, in three counties, have ended in disaster, either with a bidder vacating sale, trying to vacate sale, or sticking the bidder with purchasing a lien and eventually losing the property. Of course, this is only our fault, right? CAVEAT EMPTOR? Why are these Condominium Lien foreclosures on this website in the first place? What is indeed the intent of these public lien auctions disguised as Foreclosures, if not to find a dufus like me who will bid over them by one dollar and instantly pay the assessments in arrears? Let's say that the county feels an obligation to offer these lethal toxic assets to the public. Although the website claims it cannot guarantee any aspects of the shown properties in regards to liens, it must put in place safeguards to make sure that the public knows exactly what these condo lien foreclosures are: a completely different bird to a mortgage foreclosure.
==========================================

First Name: Erika
Last Name: Ginsberg-Klemmt
Phone:
Email: erika@srqus.com
Phone: 9412840057
Address: 3364 tanglewood drive
City: sarasota
Country: United Statesay be posted to the IBLS Community blog.:Yes

Defamation Lawsuit?

Jerry — Thu, 29 Oct 2009 18:49:00 GMT

Legal Issue:

I have a question. My information was put on Craig's List website for sex and other things, by somebody not myself. Is there anyway to sue or prosecute that person? I talked to local law enforcement and was told that because that person did not take money or anything like that there was nothing that could be done. Well, isn't slander and defamation of character against the law? Please let me know. Thanks. Kerry Burns

First Name: Kerry
Last Name: Burns
Phone:
Email: kerburns@iupui.edu
Phone: 2192042794
Address: 721 Barbados Drive
City: Indianapolis
Country: United States

Breach of Contract?

Jerry — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 17:48:00 GMT

I ordered a Sprinter Van manufatured by Mercedes Bentz. I made this order over the internet and requested this van with certain dimensions. The van I ordered was a 170 inch wheelbase, extended van body with a high roof. When the van was delivered, it was not the ext van which elimnated over 1200 sq.feet of cargo space. The company ( Freightliner of Cinn,Ohio "FYDA") claimed I never ordered or requested the extended model. Every internet correspondence over a period of 5 months always contained in my E-Mails to FYDA Freighliner included the following heading RE: 2007 Freightliner Ext 170 inch WB High Roof Sprinter Van.... Now they claim that I cannot sue them for not providing the extended van, in the State of New Mexico. That the jurisdiction lies in the state of Ohio. There is a clear breach of our agreement, and all communications were perpetrated from New Mexico to FYDA in Cinn, Ohio. We paid for the van by Certified Check from our Bank here in NM. Their claims are they don't regularly do buisness in the sates of New Mexico, and thus cannot be held liable nor does jurisdiction apply from the state of New Mexico. Is this true ? Can I seek re-dress in State or Federal Ct ?
==========================================

First Name: Marshall
Last Name: Massengill
Phone:
Email: massengillalbq@aol.com
Phone: 505-328-2458
Address: 10327 Heron Rd, SW
City: Albuquerque,NM
Country: United States
==========================================

Refund Refusal: Need US Representation

Jerry — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 17:36:00 GMT

Legal Issue:

I live in France and in January 09, I made a deposit to attend a self-improvement program hosted by a New-York City based company. At the time I made the deposit, the refund policy (displayed on their website) was that they could hold up to $500 of the money already received. Things came up and I'm now unable to make it to NYC and thus attend the program, but when I ask for a refund they refuse to reimburse me, by giving me false arguments. Moreover, since January, they changed their Terms of Service without informing me beforehand, and now I have no written evidence of what the ToS were when I signed up and they try to use that fact against me. What can I do? I know I'm in my right to get my money(~$2800).
==========================================

FIrst Name:Joel
Last Name: Marchand
Phone:
Email: anatolhenri@hotmail.fr
Phone: 0033646496551
Address: 32 gradne
City: Garches
Country: France

LAW FIRM for LIBEL Case

Jerry — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 20:48:00 GMT

Legal Issue:

Physicians are under attack in general. Some of the most distressing assaults come from doctor rating websites where any "nut job" who feels he didn't get value for his $10 co-pay can publish for the world to see any libel he wishes about his physician-victim without revealing his identity. Skill, training and professional reputation offer no protection. I'm looking for a law firm who will consider taking my case on contingency. I can identify the blogger.
==========================================

First Name: carol
Last Name: foulds
Phone:
Email: cfoulds@midwestdermatology.com
Phone: 913-814-8561
Address: 6730 w. 121st
City: overland park
Country: United States

Paypal Scam Payment?

Jerry — Thu, 22 Oct 2009 17:15:00 GMT

Legal Issue:

how long is acceptable scams? Hi! Dear,sir! I've paid DHgate with paypal for a particular item Oct. 13, 2009 10:56:16 PDT Transaction ID: 8R7070062N151135G,but the Company to date do not provide any clear answer.One day I receive confirmation ,that the money has been received, but after a few hours the opposite pattern, that money has been not received.Pay pal multiplexed, has confirmed that the account has money dhgate is creditedi.On my questions DHgate not answered.Can you something help me,please?Or ,must I write to Minisrty of Justice, the People's Republic of China Address: No.10 Nandajie, Chaoyangmen, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100020, China and National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of China NO.2 Guang'An Men Nan Jie, Xuanwu Disrict, Beijing 100053 With best regards,Viktors GraudinsCompany: Reality Research centre
First Name: Viktors
Last Name: Graudins
Phone:
Email: viktorsg123@inbox.lv
Phone: 371 29628572
Address: Unijas 24-29
City: Riga
Country: Latvia

VAT Levied on United States Internet Service Providers in the United Kingdom

IBLS Editor — Mon, 19 Oct 2009 03:36:00 GMT

Between 1997 and 2001, the Commissioners of Customs and Excise did not subject foreign telecom suppliers supplying mixed packages in the United Kingdom to value added tax (VAT). Yet, after February 2001, the commissioners considered that foreign telecom suppliers could be subject to VAT when supplying mixed packages in the United Kingdom (UK) and it was proved that the provision of telecom services was the predominant part of any package of services supplied. Hence, from 2001 until 2003, foreign telecom suppliers in the UK were not subject to VAT. This rose complaints from UK service providers before the Customs and Excise Commissioners. Some of these complaints even escalated to judicial review. This article provides an example of a UK case where the UK service provider complained against the commissioners because a foreign service provider was not subject to VAT, although providing mixed package services in the UK.

In UK case of R (on the application of Freeserve.com plc) v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (America Online Inc, interested party), [2003] EWHC 2736, (hereafter Freeserve v. AOL) the administrative court was to decide whether telecom suppliers incorporated outside the European Union and supplying mixed packages services in the UK were subject to VAT. This case was decided before the European Union established a uniform taxation mechanism where anyone providing Internet services in the European Union is subject to VAT, including foreign providers.

The claimant in this case, Freeserve, was an Internet service provider (ISP) incorporated in the UK and supplying telecom services in that country. The claimant complained before the Customs and Excise Commissioners noting that foreign telecom suppliers were not subject to VAT and this created an unfair treatment. The Commissioners ruled against the claimant and the claimant sought judicial review. American Online (AOL) was an interested party to this dispute. AOL, a company incorporated in Delaware, U.S., supplied telecom services in the UK, including mixed package services. AOL was not subject to VAT between 2001 and 2003.

The Administrative court held that (1) the commissioners were under a duty to look and decide claimant’s case against AOL considering the administration of VAT as a whole; and (2) that one taxpayer had not judicial standing to bring judicial review proceedings against the taxing authorities with relation to the tax affairs of another. The court noted that there was an exception to this rule when the claimant had a peculiar interest in the impact of the decision taken by the tax authorities. In this particular case, the exception did not apply, the court said, because any AOL competitor would be able to seek judicial review and complain that AOL were not subject to VAT. Thus, Freeserve had no standing to pursue this judicial review and it was dismissed. This was distinguished from R v A-G, ex p ICI plc (1984) 60 TC 1.

After this 2003 case, the European Union has established legislation requiring ISP incorporated in countries outside the European Union to pay VAT when supplying services within the European Union. The relevance of the Freeserve case still reminds as to a UK ISP’s legal standing to bring judicial review for unequal application of VAT rules to a foreign-incorporated ISP rending services within the UK.

Hidden Video Cameras at the Workplace: is this a Violation of Privacy?

Martha L. Arias — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 03:39:00 GMT

Technology is invading people’s space and depriving them of their right to privacy. Installation of hidden video cameras at the workplace, for instance, is a current topic that deserves legal attention. Most employers, usually for security reasons, are installing surveillance systems at the workplace. Yet, some of these cameras are not conspicuously placed and may be directed to recording questionable activities. Is installing hidden video cameras at the workplace a violation of privacy? This article presents California’s Supreme Court position on this issue.

Consensual video surveillance by private parties is considered legal under state tort laws. Thus, once parties consent to this surveillance at the workplace, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet, the legal issue arises when employers secretly install cameras at the workplace. In the California case of Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal. 4th 272 (2009), the Supreme Court of California was to determine whether an employer’s surveillance camera installed at the workplace, without the employee’s knowledge, constituted a violation of the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

In Hernandez, the employer defendant placed surveillance cameras in plaintiff employees’ offices at the workplace. The employer’s intention was to know who the person accessing sexually explicit websites was. It seems that this person accessed the company’s Internet after office hours. Plaintiff employees stayed after office hours and sometimes –closed doors-changed clothing before leaving for after-work exercise. Also, plaintiffs were women and they showed each other their postpartum marks. These events were recorded. Plaintiffs sued employer for invasion of privacy under state common law and state Constitutional principles, and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed the case. The California Court of Appeal reversed. The case went to California Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the court of appeal in so far as the privacy claim, and allowed plaintiff employees to proceed at trial.

The Supreme Court held that a privacy violation based on common law tort of intrusion has two elements: “(1) the defendant must intentionally intrude into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” (2) “the intrusion must occur in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” “These limitations on the right to privacy are not insignificant. Nonetheless, the cause of action recognizes a measure of personal control over the individual's autonomy, dignity, and serenity. The gravamen is the mental anguish sustained when both conditions of liability exist.” Further, the Court held that the defendant must have penetrated a zone of physical or sensory privacy or obtained unwanted access to data by electronic or other means, in violation of the law or social norms. In any circumstance, the expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable. This reasonableness is linked to three factors: the identity of the intruder, the extent to which other persons had access to the subject place, and the means by which the intrusion occurred.

Regarding the right to privacy under California Constitution, the Court held that its elements are similar to those under common law tort. The plaintiff must meet three requirements: (1) he must possess a legally protected privacy interest. This includes conducting certain activities without observation, intrusion, or interference as established by social norms; (2) plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy must be reasonable. Here, we have to examine customs, practices, and the setting surrounding particular activities, as well as notification and consent to the intrusion; (3) plaintiff must show that the intrusion is serious in nature, scope, and actual or potential impact as to violate social norms.

After setting the standards for privacy violations under state common law torts and state Constitutional law, the court held that a jury could have found that the required intrusion existed. Therefore, the court held that, although plaintiffs’ privacy in a shared office were not absolute, “they had a reasonable expectation of privacy under widely held social norms that the employer would not install video equipment capable of monitoring and recording their activities—personal and work-related—behind closed doors without their knowledge or consent.”

Import to Brazil

Jerry — Mon, 12 Oct 2009 16:59:00 GMT

hi... I wonder how I can buy a bike kx250f in the United States of America or in China and bring the bike to Brazil with certainty that she checks up to me and not get stopped in customs, I would like to know which documents to import and value rates, and would not be necessary because emplacar and a motorcycle off-road this bike costs around $ 3500.00 thanks .

Company:smalcell celulares ltda
First Name: mateus
Last Name: assuncao
Phone:
Email: mateus.assuncao@hotmail.com
Phone: 555555555555
Address: r raimundo
City: bh

The Single Publication Rule Applied to Internet Defamation

Martha L. Arias — Mon, 12 Oct 2009 01:11:00 GMT

Certain traditional torts such as defamation are gaining significance in cyberspace. Internet defamation has risen and will continue rising as the Internet penetrates our lives. In the United States, for instance, there are numerous precedent decisions solving particular issues of defamation when this tort is applied to the cyber world. It is interesting to observe how the first Internet defamation cases have addressed those same basic principles that once traditional defamation cases addressed. The single publication rule is one of these basic principles, and this article briefly shows that most U.S. state courts favor its application to Internet defamation cases.

One of the most important elements of the defamation tort is that the defamatory statement must be libelous. When the publisher of the libelous matter makes it available to its intended audience, the tort is completed (provided that the other elements, not a subject of this article, are met). Publication is complete on the last day of the mass distribution of printed copies. Williamson v. New Times, Inc., 980 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998). The statute of limitation precludes victims of defamatory statements to file lawsuits after the statute of limitation expires (usually 1-2 years). For purposes of the statute of limitations, the period starts to run when the publication is complete. This is commonly known as the “single publication rule.” The purpose of this rule is to prevent stale and repetitive claims against publishers. See, Holloway v. Butler, 662 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1983). Separate printings of a libelous matter are considered subsequent publications.

Thus, the single publication rule is extremely important because it determines when a legal claim is within or out of the statute of limitation period. Whether the single publication rule applies to Internet defamation cases is still a controversy. Some argue this rule should apply, while others claim it should not apply to Internet cases. Some supporters, for instance, argue that application of the single publication rule to Internet defamation may create abuse, but support its application when the website is truly available to the public. See, Cyber-Defamation and the Single Publication Rule, 81 B.U. L. REV. 895, 913-14 (2001). Others claim that the single publication rule should not apply to Internet defamation. See, Internet Publications and Defamation: Why the Single Publication Rule Should Not Apply, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 325, 332-37 (2002). Among the ones opposing its application, we find the ones that hold that Internet defamation cases should consider the continuous publication rule. This means, that republication occurs when each viewer accesses a defamatory article from a website.

New York is one of the few states that first applied the single publication rule to Internet publications. In the case of Firth v. State, 98 N.Y.2d 365, 775 N.E.2d 463, 466, 747 N.Y.S.2d 69 (N.Y. 2002) (Firth, in short), the plaintiff sued the publisher of a report that was published on the Internet. Plaintiff argued the continuous publication rule. He claimed that each day the report was available on the Internet, it constituted a new publication. The court held that "a multiple publication rule would implicate an even greater potential for endless retriggering of the statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of defendants." The court also held that application of this rule to the Internet would cause an inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet. Thus, the court held that the single publication rule applied to Internet publications. California, Georgia, New Jersey, and Texas have also applied the single publication rule to Internet publication and defamation.

Therefore, it is likely that U.S. state courts will continue the trend and apply the single publication rule to Internet publications and defamation. Public policy favors application of this rule for the benefit and the development of the Internet; choosing otherwise will create judicial chaos because it could bring massive lawsuits and endless litigation.

International Tax Question

Jerry — Fri, 09 Oct 2009 21:08:00 GMT

Company: M/UX, Inc.
First Name: Liz
Last Name: Zainasheff
Phone:
Email: liz@mux-ed.com
Phone: 916-226-2536
Address: 9245 Laguna Springs Drive, Suite 315
City: Elk Grove
Country: United States
==============================

============

Legal Issue:

M/UX delivers technical training via the internet that originates in either California, Colorado, or Arizona. The students take the training from their home or work in any country in the world. What international tax laws apply to this type of e-commerce?

Multi-National Shareholders?

Jerry — Wed, 07 Oct 2009 23:24:00 GMT

Me and a friend of mine will be starting a business together. My friend is from US and I am in India. He has setup a firm and wants to give me some shares for the same. How would be this possible as I am a citizen of India and he is from US. Is there a possible way we can be partners accross countries & continitents? Is there a way he can have me as a share holder in his company?

First Name: Pranay
Last Name: Arora
Phone:
Email: pranayarora81@gmail.com
Phone: 9818811774
Address: B-118, Dayanand Colony, Lajpat Nagar - 4
City: New Delhi

Data Processing Services under the Australia-India Double Taxation Treaty

Martha L. Arias — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 02:48:00 GMT

Double taxation avoidance agreements are significant for e-commerce transactions and, particularly, for transactions involving foreign outsourcing of data processing services. Application of these agreements, however, may turn complex in cases involving technology and data processing services. This article provides a practical example of the application of the double taxation avoidance agreement between Australia and India in the context of data processing services.

Australia and India entered into a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA, in short) in 1992, 194 ITR Statute 91. This tax treaty provided allocation of taxing rights between the contracting states. Regarding royalty payments, Art. 12(3) of the agreement defines what constitutes royalty payments. Art. 12(3)(a) says that royalty payments include those made for “the use of, or the right to use of, any copyright, patent, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, trade mark, or other like property or right.” Also, it would be a royalty payment, according to Art. 12(3)(b), when the payment is for "the use of, or the right to use, any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment." Art. 12(3)(c) provides that when the payment [from one company to the other foreign company] is for “the supply of scientific, technical, industrial or commercial knowledge or information,” this payment should be considered royalty for purposes of Art. 12(3).

The following also constitute royalty payments according to Art. 12(3): “(d) the rendering of any technical or consultancy services (including those of technical or other personnel) which are ancillary and subsidiary to the application or enjoyment of any such property or right as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (a), any such equipment as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) or any such knowledge or information as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (c); (e) the use of, or the right to use (i) motion picture films; (ii) films or video tapes for use in connection with television; or (iii) tapes for use in connection with radio broadcasting; (f) total or partial forbearance in respect of the use or supply of any property or right referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e); or (g) the rendering of any services (including those of technical or other personnel) which make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or design; but that term does not include payments or credits relating to services mentioned in sub-paragraphs (d) and (g) that are made; (h) for services that are ancillary and subsidiary, and inextricably and essentially linked, to a sale of property; (i) for services that are ancillary and subsidiary to the rental of ships, aircraft containers or other equipment used in connection with the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic; (j) for teaching in or by an educational institution; (k) for services for the personal use of the individual or individuals making the payments or credits; or (l) to an employee of the person making the payments or credits or to any individual or firm of individuals (other than a company) for professional services as defined in article 14.”

According to Indian tax law, Income Tax Act 1961, Art. 90(2), the provisions of this tax treaty prevail over domestic law unless the domestic law is more beneficial to the assessee.

In the Indian case of Kotak Mahindra Primus Ltd. v. Deputy Director of Income-Tax, the court was to decide whether the Indian tax authority could demand an Indian company to withhold tax at 15% from payments made to an Australian company. Kotak Mahindra Primus Ltd (Kotak) is an Indian company jointly formed by the Indian company Kotak Mahindra Finance Limited, and a United States company named Ford Credit International Inc. Kotak is engaged in the business of providing finance for car purchases. Kotak contracted data processing services with an Australian company named Ford Credit Australia Limited.

The Indian tax authorities demanded Kotak to pay withholding tax at 15% from payments made to the Australian company. Kotak claimed not such payments were required under the Australia-India DTAA. The Indian court reviewed the Australia-India DTAA, particularly Art. 12 regarding royalty payments, and concluded that Kotak was not required to pay this withholding tax. The court specifically analyzed Art. 12(3)(a), (b), (c), and (d) because they were relevant to the issue of whether payments for data processing services constitute royalty payments for withholding tax purposes. Regarding possible application of Art. 12(3)(a), the court held that payment for data processing are not payments for the use of software. Regarding royalty payments for the use of scientific equipment, Art. 12(3)(b), the court held that data processing does not required the exclusive use of mainframe computer. Although data processing services involve the use of mainframe computers, they did not exclusively required control or physical access to that mainframe computer. Art. 12(3)(c) does not apply, the court held, because data processing does not involve the transfer of knowledge or information. Indeed, the information is supplied by the Indian company to the Australian company, and the later just processes that information. Lastly, the Indian court held that payments for data processing services are not royalties under Art. 12(3)(d) because those services do not constitute consultancy services. Payments to the Australian company are not made to obtain any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes.

Therefore, the Indian Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in Kotak held that “a company's payment to an Australian company for data-processing services was not a royalty payment under the Australia-India income tax treaty and that no Indian withholding tax was due.”

GPS Tracking for Children: Is It a Violation of Children’s Privacy?

Martha L. Arias — Wed, 30 Sep 2009 10:47:00 GMT

Nowadays, we can use a GPS (global positioning system) to track our children’s steps. A child locator or kids GPS is an advanced technology system that helps parents know where their children are. The system provides immediate wander alerts and directional guidance so parents know the specific location where their children are and are aware if children get away from school or “authorized zones.” Kids GPS vary on capability, area of coverage, functions, and prices. Some of them allow audio. This means, you can hear children’s conversations anywhere they are. GPS tracking for children may also be ordered by courts in juvenile cases as condition for probation. Is GPS tracking for children a violation of children’s right to privacy or denial of equal protection of the law?

GPS tracking systems may be installed in children’s clothing, backpacks, watches, etc. Also, they are commonly used by parents to track teenagers. They can be placed in the teenager’s car and any other accessory that provides no warning to the juvenile. It is a fact that in the United States and, probably in many other countries, missing children is an ever increasing problem. The use of kids GPS may be an excellent source to save children’s lives. Some may call the use of kids GPS safety and others may call it paranoia. Yet, this is not the relevant issue. The relevant issue is whether GPS tracking for children violates children’s privacy when used by parents. For the time being, there is no legal precedent decision to answer this specific question in the United States (U.S.). The Constitution and Privacy laws of the United States protect individuals’ freedoms and privacy. They usually do not differentiate on whether the individual is a minor or an adult. In fact, the Constitution of the United States guarantees equal protection of the law. Thus, by now we can just voice our opinions and wait for the first legal decision that addresses this specific issue.

Regarding GPS children tracking by court order, some U.S. courts have addressed the issue of GPS tracking systems used in juvenile offenders who are placed in probation. In the California case of Re R.V., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (2009), the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, answered the question of whether a GPS tracking system placed in juvenile offenders as condition for probation was a violation of the minor’s right to privacy and denial of equal protection of the law.

The juvenile in this case was a 16 years old and accused of receiving stolen property for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The facts show the minor used illegal substances, was involved in gang activities, and had no parental control. After conviction, the minor was ordered home detention, which he violated several times. Then, the minor was ordered to use a GPS tracking device to assure that he was attending school and that he was within the court-authorized zones. The minor challenged the imposition of the GPS device. He argued it violated his privacy rights and his right to Equal Protection of the law.

The court held that the GPS tracking system imposed for this minor did not violate his right to privacy or deny him equal protection of the law. The court held that this system was statutorily authorized for adult probationers and was also permissible for juvenile probation. Also, the court held, this tracking system was reasonable related to the minor’s past behavior and was likely to deter future criminality. The juvenile was being monitored to assure that he was at school and observing his curfew.

Therefore, GPS tracking for children when ordered by courts for probation purposes may not violate children’s right to privacy or deny them equal protection of the law. Hence, whether the same tracking system used by parents violates privacy rights is another issue not yet addressed by the U.S. courts.

Court-Ordered Parenting Programs: State Courses v. Out-of-State Online Courses

Martha L. Arias — Mon, 28 Sep 2009 02:08:00 GMT

United States (U.S.) family courts are increasingly ordering parents facing divorce with minor children to attend parenting programs. These programs are designed to help parents and children solve those major issues that divorce brings, such as adjustment of children to parental separation, dispute resolution and conflict management, visitation guidelines, united parenting, and stress reduction in children. This is definitely a wise recourse to keep both parents involved in the children’s future and to lessen the emotional impact of divorce. Connecticut is one of the states whose statutes order parenting education programs. This article illustrates on the approach Connecticut’s courts took regarding parenting education programs offered by out-of-state vendors and taken online.

Connecticut’s General Statutes Sec. 46b-69b and Practice Book Sec. 25-5(a)(6) require parenting education programs whenever a minor child is involved in divorce proceedings. These programs last six hours, and may be taken in two courses of three-hour class or three courses of two-hour class. Connecticut defines parenting education programs as "[A] course designed by the Judicial Department to educate persons, including unmarried parents, on the impact on children of the restructuring of families. The course shall include, but not be limited to, information on the development stages of children, adjustment of children to parental separation, dispute resolution and conflict management, guidelines for visitation, stress reduction in children and cooperative parenting. Parents may take “comparable” parenting education programs. This means, they may choose different course vendors as long as the courses are comparable.

In the case of Recile v. Recile, FA-054-008-087S (2006), the Superior Court of Connecticut, District of Waterbury, first answered the question of whether an online parenting education course offered by a Florida vendor was a comparable course and allowed under the Connecticut statute for purposes of compliance with the court-ordered parenting education program. In this case, plaintiff requested the court to permit him to enroll in a Florida parenting education program called Positive Parenting Through Divorce (PPTD), which was offered online. Plaintiff did not submit evidence that this course was comparable with Connecticut’s programs. Connecticut’s Superior Court had held in the case of Victor v. Victor, Docket No. FA 99 0174903 (2001), that a New York parenting education program was comparable or substantially similar to those offered in Connecticut and, therefore, the requesting parent could complete that course. Thus, according to this precedent, it is required that out-of-states programs be substantially similar to those offered in Connecticut. In Recile v. Recile, the court held that the Florida online program was not substantially similar or comparable with parenting education programs offered in Connecticut.

Also, the court addressed the issue of whether these courses must be taken in-person or whether online courses comply with the purpose of the statute. To answer this question, the court first reviewed surveys showing the positive impact parenting education programs have shown in Connecticut. Then, the court reviewed the language of the statute and the legislative intent. The court held that the language of the statute does not expressly allow parties to participate in online parenting education courses. Regarding the legislative intent, the court held that the legislature intended the parenting education programs to be in-person. The legislature even provided examples of in-person courses deemed to be effective in helping couples facing divorce.

The court said that online parenting education courses do not provide the interactive and complete information that in-person courses do. For instance, in-person courses have a mixture of videos, chats, and role playing scenarios that may relate to parents’ own situation. Yet, the online courses may be less interactive and only help parents to go through the course material as quickly as possible to obtain the required certification. Also, the court noted, online courses do not provide the assurance that the one taking the course is really the parent to whom the court order is issued. Lastly, the court said that parenting education courses are ordered for the benefit of children and, in the case of online courses, parental convenience should not be given foremost consideration.

Therefore, in Recile v. Recile, Connecticut’s Superior Court rejected the approval of online parenting education courses.